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*Mytsyk L.M., Nizhyn*

## **THE NEW WORLD ORDER FROM THE AMERICAN SCHOLARS' PERSPECTIVE**

*The article analyzes the basic conceptual approaches of American scholars and experts to the world order after the end of the Cold War. The author emphasizes "American-centered" approaches in comparison with "great concepts" of the content and formal principles of the new international system. The author concludes that the recognition of the USA as the only world superpower after the end of the Cold War corresponds to the concepts of a unipolar international order or a multipolar system with a distinct subjective domination of the United States. American researchers offered two models of the new world order. The first vision is a leadership model based on respect for the rights and interests of all other actors in international relations; the second one is the neoconservative dominance model, based on the military components and realized within the framework of unilateral actions.*

**Key words:** *international system, world order, scientific approach, conception, paradigm, multipolarity, unipolarity.*

**General problem statement and its connection with important scientific and practical tasks.** The end of the Cold War determined the need to define a new world order and to model the architecture of the international environment, the basis on which it should be implemented (values, aspirations, etc.), characteristics of relations between its main participants. It was also important to identify the place and role of the United States as the winner in the Cold War in a new international reality.

**Analysis of recent research and publications.** The response to such needs was the scientific debate on the problems of the new world order that were taking place in the United States during the

1990s. International policy experts from various political, scientific, journalistic environments, as well as representatives of different theoretical schools took part in them. Such famous scholars as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Charles Krauthammer, Robert Kagan, William Kristol, Robert Kaplan, Joseph S. Nye, Charles Kupchan, Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington played an extremely important role in the debate. They presented their views in the form of scientific monographs and publications in prestigious periodicals, announcements and short notes in the daily press.

A characteristic feature of the American debate was the heterogeneity of approaches and presented ideas that made it difficult to define the new order and subordinate those conceptions to particular theoretical schools unambiguously. It resulted in the emergence of many more or less integral and complex visions, which were based on different motivational principles and appealed to different theoretical traditions. Those were "great theories", whose authors had a global vision of the world, for example, those who presented economic liberalism, the approaches of Francis Fukuyama[5; 6] and Thomas Friedman[4] (the global order based on economic liberalism, promoted by the United States), the theory of S. Huntington grounded on a civilizational paradigm (the clash of civilizations) [9; 10]. Other authors emphasized the international order in terms of balance of power between the participants. In the context of a realistic tradition, the vision of H. Kissinger (nation order with the current global role of the USA) [15; 16], Z. Brzezinski (American world system) [1; 2; 3], S. Huntington (the order of "unipolar multipolarity") [11], Richard Haass (regulatory international order) [7], the conceptions of Ch. Krauthammer[17; 18; 19], W. Kristol [20], R. Kagan [12; 13].

**Formulating the purpose of the article.** The purpose of the paper is to analyze, compare and systematize basic scientific paradigms and conceptual approaches toward the content and formal principles of the new world order that were presented during the American debate of the 1990s.

**Presentation of the main research material from complete justification of the received scientific results.** Obviously, the shape

of the world order, which was formed as a result of this debate, was not a holistic, homogeneous one. However, the authors of those conceptions combined the appeal to a realistic tradition and analysis of the problem of the international system from the perspective of the needs and behavior of nations. At the same time, most experts showed commitment to dominant role of the United States, which, in view of their strength and exceptional status in the international environment, should have played the role of stabilizer of the new world order. With this in mind, those conceptions are called "American-centered" vision of the international system. The authors of the "American-centered" theories agreed that the United States is the only global superpower, which strength is based on the absolute superiority in the military, economic, technological, and cultural areas, as well as on moral victory in the Cold War, the American exceptionalism, the belief in the US "historical mission" to protect, promote and extend democracy and freedom around the world

However, regardless of the commitment to the "American-centered" perspective of the world order, those conceptions differ from each other in terms of understanding the structure of the international system, the principles of its functioning and the nature of the relations between the participants, as well as the directions of its evolution.

Most of the authors of the "American-centered" theories of the international system, appealing to a realistic tradition, usually constructed a structure of a new order based on the dominant balance of power in it, accepting the United States as the superpower. Since the possibility of restoring bipolar order was unambiguously rejected after the end of the Cold War, the new conceptions were built on *multipolar* (which stability would be ensured by a balance of power between the main participants) and *unipolar* (the functioning of which would be based on the hegemony of one superpower) models. Medium variants that included elements of both systems were possible, for example, S. Huntington's theory of the "unipolar multipolarity" [11].

One of the supporters of the multipolarity of the new order was H. Kissinger. Although he could not unambiguously typologize

the new international system (supposing that it would have a transitional nature for a long time), Kissinger in his *"Diplomacy"* preferred a vision according to which the core of international order would be a multi-state system based on six key superpowers such as the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia and India (although he was not completely convinced in the prominent role of the latter) [15, p. 24]. According to H. Kissinger, "America will be the greatest and most powerful nation, but a nation with peers; the primus inter pares but nonetheless a nation like others"[15, p. 809–810]. Due to the special status of the United States, H. Kissinger's new multipolar order after the end of the Cold War differed from "classical multipolarity," which implies the existence of several independent and equilibrium centers capable of formulating rules and distributing and redistributing power. On the contrary, the new multipolarity was characterized by the existence of several centers with apparently comparable potentials and one main, definitely stronger subject. Such a model of the international system, based on the balance of power between several great powers and one superpower, should lead to stability and maintenance of peace, however, that would be possible only if the community based on democratic values was established [15, p. 838].

Z. Brzezinski rejected the theory of multipolarity and balance of power as a model of new relations in the world. He introduced his vision of a new order in the *"The Grand Chessboard"* [2]. In his view, the world after the Cold War was characterized by a distinct unipolarity, and the only power that was really capable of maintaining the order and stability of the international environment was the United States, which should play the role of the world political arbiter. In his vision of the "American world system", Z. Brzezinski appealed to the classical geopolitics simultaneously, emphasizing that space with the key importance for a new international order is Eurasia. According to the scholar, "Eurasia is a chessboard on which there is a struggle for world hegemony," and the force that would seize this space could threaten the US position, and thus the stability of the world system [2, p. XXX]. He confirmed the vision of unipolarity of the new world dominated by the United

States in his next reports and publications, the crown of which was *"The Choice: Domination or Leadership"* [3].

The advocate of the unipolar world theory was Charles Krauthammer, who is recognized to be one of the ideologists of neo-conservatism [8; 22]. In his *"The Unipolar Moment"* Krauthammer wrote: "It has been assumed that the old bipolar world would beget a multipolar world with power dispersed to new centers in Japan, Germany (and/or "Europe"), China and a diminished Soviet Union/Russia. This is mistaken. The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is an unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies." [19]. Over the next few years, the author strengthened the conviction of unipolarity and USA dominance. In 2002, he presented a revised version of the conception of a "unipolar wave," arguing that twelve years after the end of the Cold War, it turned into a "unipolar era" that, due to the strength and engagement of the United States, will have a great deal of time perspective. The Krauthammer's unipolar theory was the starting point for the reflection of such prominent theorists of neo-conservatism as W. Kristol, R. Kagan, N. Podhoretz. According to those scholars, the new world order was definitely unipolar with the United States hegemony that ensures them moral rights, as well as a duty to act as a global leader, using a variety of means, including military ones [13; 20].

The original idea of combining the uni- and multipolar models of a new international system (the so-called "hybrid theory") was propounded by Samuel Huntington. In his resonance *"The Lonely Superpower"*, he argued that the new world order is the "uni-multipolar system" with one superpower and several major powers [11]. The United States, of course, is the sole state with preeminence in every domain of power [11, p. 1]. According to S. Huntington, none of participants of this model of international order seeks to maintain it: the United States as a superpower quite explicitly prefers a unipolar system under its hegemony, while multipolarity would be the most acceptable one for the other major powers. So, Huntington predicts the transition to a truly multipolar order of the 21st century [11, p. 2]

Hence, regardless of commitment of authors of "American-centered" theories to uni- or multipolar order, it was rather a hierarchical model in which the United States was the dominant leader (hegemon). That was a sufficient argument to characterize this order as a "new hegemony" or "a new Pax Americana".

Supporters of the "American-centered" approaches toward the international order emphasized issues of its functioning rather than the description of its structure. The key issue, therefore, was to outline the nature of the relationship between the participants in the new order and the need to determine the role and significance of the United States, defined as a "superpower", a hegemon or even an empire.

Even immediately after the end of the Cold War, most researchers and politicians agreed that the main precondition for maintaining the stability of the international order should be the engagement of the United States, so they clearly opposed to neo-isolationism. The views of authors conceptually differed only regarding the nature of the engagement (whether that would be global activism or global interventionism) as well as ways of implementing it (multi- or unilateralism). Consequently, two models of functioning of the new international order can be revealed: the first one seems to be the order with the US world leadership, while the second one, instead, means the order with the American domination throughout the world. Those models can be defined as conceptions of "soft" and "hard" hegemony.

Proponents of the model of the American leadership (Z. Brzezinski, H. Kissinger, R Haass, J.S Nye, Ch. Kupchan) advocated the status of the United States as a global leader, which would fulfill its role with respect to the views and rights of other members of the international arena. Z. Brzezinski emphasized that, despite the US supremacy, the new system does not have the character of a hierarchical pyramid of power, and the decision-making process provides a significant place for negotiations, agreements, compromises and consensus [2, p. XXXIII]. He added that exclusively an international consensus could legitimize and strengthen new American leadership [3, p. 236]. H. Kissinger shares

the same view, arguing that the United States, regardless of its undoubted superiority, should not ignore partners and international law, as it can indeed lead to a destabilization of the international environment. J.S Nye and Ch. Kupchan believe that the United States can not afford unilateralism and levity towards other members of the international order. In their publications, they constantly emphasize the paradox of American power, which is "too large to be balanced by some other state, and at the same time too small to resolve independently such issues as international terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" [23, p. 40; 21, p. 3–35]. R Haass presents the middle position between leadership and dominance in the international order. In his view, the key precondition of maintaining stability and preventing uncertainty in the international environment should be the functioning of the international order at the established regulators, which would give a special combination of multilateralism with unilateralism: "The United States should act where possible, with others, but on its own where it is necessary and real... In the ideal case, multilateral norms, agreements and institutions, which are truly helpful in the management of international relations, would be developed "[7, p. 16].

According to the model of American domination, which is advocated by neoconservatives, the United States should use its power to manage the world (to thrust its will and world vision on other members of the system) and maintain peace and security on a global scale, relying mainly on armed forces. Accordingly, that conception presupposes a consistent engagement of the United States ("conservative internationalism" [24]) through the implementation of unilateralism and the rejection of multilateralism, the realization of dominance using all means, including military force, as well as the inclusion of moral categories in the perception of international politics [8, p. 11].

Charles Krauthammer, reflecting on the new role of the United States in the world, criticizes the solutions offered by others. He supports the so-called "new unilateralism" that "defines American interests far beyond narrow self-defense. In particular, it identifies

two other major interests, both global: extending the peace by advancing democracy and preserving the peace by acting as balancer of last resort..." [18]. In a speech delivered in February 2004, Krauthammer presented his "democratic realism" that should be interpreted as a modified and concretized version of the "democratic globalism", which is understood as an American engagement in the name of extending democracy and protecting core values [17, p. 9]. W. Kristol and R. Kagan shared the vision that only American hegemony, based on the military "supremacy" and moral confidence, is capable of effectively protecting peace and international order [20].

Most authors of "American-centered" theories realize that the United States's superiority over other actors in international relations will not be endless, and in the longer or shorter time it will be reduced – both under the influence of endogenous (fatigue from the role of leader, closure and isolation from the world), as well as exogenous (growth of competitors' power) factors. As R. Haass predicts, reducing the United States sustained supremacy "will be the result of two fundamental factors: on the one hand, the emergence of competitive centers of political, economic, military strength; on the other hand, not an obligatory but rather plausible weakening of America's will and determination, in terms of maintaining the status of the world superpower" [7, p. 14–15]. R. Haass writes that it is unclear what order can be formed after the end of the American dominance in the world ("whether that will be anarchy, a new Cold War, a multipolar balance of power, an achievement of consensus between like-minded nations, the era of democracy, peace and prosperity, the combination of all of those ones, or probably something completely different" [7, p. 15]), but if the functioning of the world was really based on regulation, then the evolution of the international order would probably not lead to anarchy and chaos.

S. Huntington argued that the international order since the end of the Cold War was in a state of constant evolution "from the bipolarity of the Cold War", through the unipolar system introduced by the Gulf War, to the current unipolar multipolarity, which will last for one or two decades and, as a result, will lead to the establishment of a true multipolarity of the 21st century" [11, p. 2].

The advocates of the American world domination interpret the issue of the evolution of the international system in the other way. In their belief, the unipolar order, based on the hegemony of the United States, should be lengthy in nature. Such opinion is shared by Ch. Krauthammer and other neoconservatives, who are convinced of the possibility of preserving American hegemony in the modern world, however, by means of military strength and the dominance of the United States.

The "American-centered" theories contradicted the so-called "declinistic vision", that was popular in the United States at the turn of the 1980s–1990s. An inspiration for the discussion of the decline of the US strength and significance in the international environment was Paul Kennedy's *"The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers"*[14]. Referring to history, the author argued that the United States is at risk of "the imperial overstretch". The United States has the typical problems of a great power, which include balancing guns and butter and investments for economic growth [14, p. 535]. The U.S.' growing military commitment to every continent...and the growing cost of military hardware severely limit available options [14, p. 514] As military expenses grow, this reduces investments in economic growth, which eventually "leads to the downward spiral of slower growth, heavier taxes, deepening domestic splits over spending priorities, and weakening capacity to bear the burdens of defense" [14, p. 533] Kennedy's advice is as follows: "The task facing American statesmen over the next decades, therefore, is to recognize that broad trends are under way, and that there is a need to "manage" affairs so that the relative erosion of the United States' position takes place slowly and smoothly, and is not accelerated by policies which bring merely short-term advantage but longer-term disadvantage" [14, p. 534]. Although the reality of the 1990s, seemed to disprove P. Kennedy's warnings (instead of decline, the United States strengthened its status as the only superpower), however, that does not mean that P. Kennedy had no rationale: his view seems not to be false, but rather premature.

It's especially interesting to compare "American-centered" approaches with two most popular post-Cold War global theories:

"the end of history" by F. Fukuyama and "civilizational paradigm" by S. Huntington. The "American-centered" conceptions seem to be closer ones to F. Fukuyama's approach [5; 6]. Although the authors of "American-centered" vision did not share the idea of the "end of history" – Fukuyama's belief that, after the fall of communism, free-market liberal democracy had won out and would become the world's "final form of human government" [6, p. 86], however, they, like him, were convinced of the attractiveness of the American model and the possibilities of its spread throughout the world. The evidence is the conception of "active engagement". At the same time, Fukuyama's theory much more emphasized economic factors (appealed to economic liberalism) and seemed to be more optimistic than "American-centered" approaches oriented to a realistic school. Fukuyama prophesied that, along with the end of the Cold War and the confrontation of the "great" ideologies, we could expect an increase in international cooperation that would promote stability in the political arena and prevent large-scale conflicts [6, p. 86].

S. Huntington presented much more pessimistic vision of a new international order. In the "clash of civilizations" theory he cautioned against thrusting a universal model of Western culture, mostly identified with the American model, on the world. According to S. Huntington, since the post-Cold War world is a world of seven or eight major civilizations, the United States as the main subject of Western civilization could prove to be a destabilizing factor, and its activity could be a source of tension and world conflicts [10, p. 474–481]. Such view was contrary to most of the "American-centered" conceptions, authors of which, like F. Fukuyama, advocated the active promotion of the American vision of the world and believed that the establishment of a universal order based on American values could preserve the world from conflicts and ensure its stability. S. Huntington argued that only recognizing the multiculturalism and heterogeneity of the world, preserving Western civilization itself (adopting an Atlanticist policy of close cooperation with European partners) could support stability and ensure peace in a multipolar, multicivilizational world [10, p. 462–497].

The vision of the international system offered within the framework of the American debate on a new world order, besides real cognitive advantages, also perform important political functions. This aspect may be the subject of a separate research.

**Conclusions from this research and prospects of further exploration in this direction.** Thus, according to most American researchers, after the end of the Cold War, the United States actually emerged as the only world superpower that had an indisputable superiority over other participants in international relations (although it is increasingly thought that this advantage was very unstable) and was able to play a stabilizing role, to be responsible for the functioning of the new world order (this has been proved in recent years). This conviction corresponds to the concepts of a unipolar international order or a multipolar system with a distinct subjective domination of the United States. The functioning of such orders should be based on the absolute supremacy of the United States in the military, political, economic, and cultural areas, and firm belief in "American exclusiveness", which justifies their global engagement, duration and stability of which are directly dependent on the status of the United States themselves. In this case, two models are offered. The first vision is a leadership model based on respect for the rights and interests of all other actors in international relations (such a suggestion is proposed by Z. Brzezinski, G. Kissinger and R. Haass); the second one is the neoconservative dominance model, based on the military components and realized within the framework of unilateral actions. It seems that the application of the first approach would provide an opportunity to strengthen the current order and maintain a strong US position for the coming years (to keep their role as a world leader). Instead, within the framework of the second model implemented today, there is a potential threat of the growth of anti-American sentiment, the polarization of the international arena, which could eventually lead to the creation of alliances against the United States (which will be perceived by other participants in international relations as an empire), and destabilization or destruction of the existing order. It is difficult to agree with the argument of the neoconservatives that a unipolar system is possible

through the use of force and the implementation of unilateral actions. The world is not exclusively unipolar, as neoconservatives suggests, and does not tolerate subjection without respect for the norms and principles of international relations. The fundamental constraints of the neoconservative concepts seems to be: first, a significant concentration of attention on military power as the main element of US supremacy and the condition of maintaining the stability of the international order; second, the belief in the perfection of the American system and the possibility of implementing this model all over the world, regardless of its heterogeneity and complexity, that leads to a significant increase of negative attitude toward the United States and accusations of their arrogance and disregard; third, the underestimation of complexity of the world (the strength of other states, the value of the activities of new actors, new problems); fourthly, the lack of trust in international institutions and international law. For these reasons, among the so-called "American-centered" visions the most convincing one seem to be the concept of pragmatic realists, supporters of American leadership in the form of "soft hegemony." In their view, the maintenance of the stability of the modern order, the strengthening of world security and the restriction of conflict situations are possible through American thoughtful leadership, which is based on cooperation and respect for international foundations and norms. However, that approach also has certain limits. According to critics, the authors of that concept did not pay attention to such essential features of the modern world as global co-dependence, cultural and social diversity; as well as they underestimated the significance of the non-militaristic determinants of the status of states, which can be attributed to the concept of soft power by Joseph S. Nye. As he emphasizes, such concepts lack a broader vision of the world with its cross-border issues and interdependencies.

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*Мицик Л.М. Американські наукові концепції нового світового порядку. У статті аналізуються основні концептуальні підходи американських вчених та експертів до формування світового порядку після завершення холодної війни. Автор особливого значення вивченню „американоцентричних” підходів, порівнюючи їх з „великими концепціями” змістових і формальних засад сучасної міжнародної системи. Автор доходить висновку, що визнання США єдиною світовою наддержавою після закінчення холодної війни кореспондується з концепціями однополярного міжнародного порядку або багатополюсної системи з виразним суб'єктним домінуванням Сполучених Штатів. Американські дослідники пропонують дві моделі. Першим баченням є модель лідерства, заснована на повазі щодо прав та інтересів усіх інших учасників міжнародних відносин. Це бачення поділяють, зокрема, З. Бжезінський, Г. Кіссінджер і Р. Гаас. Другий підхід – запропонована неоконсерваторами модель домінування, заснована на силових компонентах, що реалізується в межах односторонніх дій. На*

думку автора, застосування першої моделі дасть можливість зміцнити міжнародний порядок і зберегти сильну позицію США як світового лідера на найближчі роки. Натомість, у межах другої моделі, що реалізується нині, існує потенційна загроза зростання антиамериканських настроїв, поляризації міжнародної арени, яка зрештою може призвести до створення альянсів проти Сполучених Штатів, а також дестабілізації або руйнування існуючого порядку. Основними обмеженнями неоконсервативних концепцій, на думку автора, є: по-перше, значна концентрація уваги на військовій силі як основному елементі верховенства США та умові збереження стабільності міжнародного порядку; по-друге, віра в досконалість американської системи і можливість реалізації цієї моделі в усьому світі, незважаючи на його неоднорідність і складність, що призводить до зростання негативного ставлення до США; по-третє, недооцінка складності світу; по-четверте, брак довіри до міжнародних інституцій і міжнародного права. Через це, серед так званих "американоцентричних" концепцій найпереконливішою видається концепція прагматичних реалістів, прихильників американського лідерства у формі "м'якої гегемонії". На їхню думку, підтримка стабільності сучасного порядку, зміцнення світової безпеки та обмеження конфліктних ситуацій можливі завдяки вдумливному американському керівництву, яке базується на співпраці та повазі до міжнародних основ і норм. Однак цей підхід також має певні обмеження. На думку критиків, автори цієї концепції не звертають уваги на такі суттєві риси сучасного світу, як глобальна взаємозалежність, культурне та соціальне розмаїття, а також недооцінюють значення невійськових детермінант статусу держав.

**Ключові слова:** міжнародно-політична система, світовий порядок, науковий підхід, концепція, парадигма, багатополюсність, уніполярність.

**Мыцык Л.Н. Американские научные концепции нового мирового порядка.** В статье анализируются основные

концептуальные подходы американских ученых и экспертов к формированию мирового порядка после окончания холодной войны. Автор уделяет особое внимание изучению "американоцентрических" подходов, сравнивая их с "великими концепциями" содержательных и формальных основ современной международной системы. Автор приходит к выводу, что признание США единственной мировой сверхдержавой после окончания холодной войны корреспондируется с концепциями однополярного международного порядка или многополюсной системы с выразительным субъектным доминированием Соединённых Штатов. Американские исследователи предлагают две модели. Первым видением является модель лидерства, основанная на уважении прав и интересов всех других участников международных отношений. Это видение разделяют, в частности, З. Бжезинский, Г. Киссинджер и Р. Гаас. Второй подход – предложенная неоконсерваторами модель доминирования, основанная на силовых компонентах и реализуемая в рамках односторонних действий. По мнению автора, применение первой модели позволит укрепить международный порядок и сохранить сильную позицию США как мирового лидера на ближайшие годы. Наоборот, в рамках второй модели, реализуемой в настоящее время, существует потенциальная угроза роста антиамериканских настроений, поляризации международной арены, которая в конечном итоге может привести к созданию альянсов против Соединённых Штатов, а также дестабилизации или разрушению существующего порядка. Основными ограничениями неоконсервативных концепций, по мнению автора, являются: во-первых, значительная концентрация внимания на военной силе как основном элементе верховенства США и условии сохранения стабильности международного порядка; во-вторых, вера в совершенство американской системы и возможность реализации этой модели во всем мире, несмотря на его неоднородность и сложность, что приводит к росту негативного отношения к США; в-третьих, недооценка

сложности мира; в-четвертых, отсутствие доверия к международным институтам и международному праву. По этим причинам среди так называемых "американоцентрических" концепций наиболее убедительной представляется концепция прагматических реалистов, сторонников американского лидерства в форме "мягкой гегемонии". По их мнению, поддержание стабильности современного порядка, укрепление мировой безопасности и ограничение конфликтных ситуаций возможны благодаря вдумчивому американскому руководству, которое базируется на сотрудничестве и уважении к международным основам и нормам. Однако этот подход также имеет определенные ограничения. По мнению критиков, авторы этой концепции не обращают внимания на такие существенные черты современного мира, как глобальная взаимозависимость, культурное и социальное разнообразие, а также недооценивают значение невоенных детерминант статуса государств.

**Ключевые слова:** международно-политическая система, мировой порядок, научный подход, концепция, парадигма, многополюсность, униполярность.